

## PERDICCAS AND ATHENS

J. W. COLE

CERTAINTY ABOUT the date of Perdiccas II's accession to the Macedonian throne is unattainable. This results not only from the impossibility of settling precisely the year of his father's death, but also from the enigmatic references in Thucydides and Plato to periods, or areas, of *arche* of his brothers, Philip and Alcetas.<sup>1</sup> We know that he was king in 432 and was still on the throne in 414, but beyond that we cannot be sure.<sup>2</sup> Athenaeus quotes six different estimates of the length of his reign, from as long as forty-one years to as short as twenty-three (217d-e).<sup>3</sup> It is obvious from this that there was no certain tradition in antiquity. The ambiguities of the fifth- and fourth-century evidence were no less perplexing in ancient times than they are today.

Thucydides, referring to Perdiccas as "formerly an ally and friend" of the Athenians, implies that he had held the royal power exclusively or in partnership for some time before 432 (1.57.2).<sup>4</sup> How far back "formerly" can be taken, it is not, of course, possible to say; one cannot even be sure that Perdiccas had to be king at the time he was an ally and friend. All that is certain is that there had been a formal, and presumably amicable, relationship between Athens and Perdiccas before 432.

Mention of an *arche* which had previously belonged to Philip occurs in

It is with a deeply-felt gratitude and affection for a colleague and friend of twenty-five years standing that I make this contribution on her retirement.

I would like to thank Professor M. B. Wallace for criticizing an earlier draft of this article. He has saved it from many imperfections; those that remain are my own responsibility.

The following particular abbreviations are used: *AncMac* = *Ancient Macedonia* (Thessaloniki 1970, Institute of Balkan Studies 122), ed. B. Laourdas and Ch. Makaronas; *Staatsverträge* = H. Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* 2 (Munich and Berlin 1962).

<sup>1</sup>Thuc. 2.100.3; Plato *Gorgias* 471a-b; cf. Aelian *VH* 7.2.41. There is no record of an *arche* of Alexander's other known sons, Amyntas and Menelaus.

<sup>2</sup>Thuc. 1.57.2; 7.9.1. For detailed discussion on the length of Perdiccas' reign see K. J. Beloch, *GG* 3.2.49-72, and F. Geyer, "Makedonia," *RE* 14.1 (1928) coll. 638-771, esp. 704-705.

<sup>3</sup>I agree with Gomme, *Commentary* on 1.57.2, that this looks like "genuine historical controversy" in ancient times as to Perdiccas' position in the early years after Alexander I's death.

<sup>4</sup>Little attention should be paid to the rhetorical exaggerations of Dem. 3.24 and 7.12 in which Kings of Macedonia are said to have been submissive, or to have rendered tribute, to Athens. Although Macedonia appears to have been disunited and militarily weak from the death of Alexander to the accession of Archelaus, it is most improbable that any Argead king was ever an unequal ally of Athens.

the context of Thucydides' account of Sitalces' invasion of Macedonia. He says that the Thracians entered the country through this area (2.100.3). Plato refers to an *arche* of Alcetas "which Perdiccas took away from him" (*Gorgias* 471a-b). On the basis of this evidence Abel suggested a distinction between the two *archai*: that of Philip is limited to a part of Macedonia, whereas that of Alcetas is exercised over the country as a whole. He posited a period of sole kingship for the latter from 454-448 and of shared rule of Philip and Perdiccas from 448-437. Only then did Perdiccas come to be sole king.<sup>5</sup> It cannot be denied that the paucity of evidence admits of this sort of reconstruction, but there is no other positive support, e.g., coins, for such a thesis.<sup>6</sup> Obviously the *archai* must be interpreted, but not in a manner which demands too much of Plato's historical accuracy. He is at his most vilificatory in this passage and, we might well suppose, a good deal less than objective.<sup>7</sup> The spirit of the writing hardly permits the extraction of such a precise meaning. In any case, if Alcetas had indeed been king, Plato would surely have made this clear, for it would add to the heinous nature of the crimes. The *arche* which Alcetas at one time possessed need be no different from that of Philip. For a period before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War both must have ruled over parts of Macedonia either as representatives of Perdiccas or, more probably, as semi-independent potentates.

Can this situation be described as a loss of national unity consequent upon the death of Alexander, or does it stem from a policy deliberately implemented by him in the closing years of his reign?<sup>8</sup> We can only guess. Alexander had certainly made substantial additions to the territorial extent of the kingdom.<sup>9</sup> He may have decided that the delegation of authority over defined areas to members of his family would conduce to sounder administration. He would not perhaps have anticipated that on his death the succession would be other than automatic, or that the hard-won unity of his country would be prejudiced by a scramble for power. Thucydides attests the existence of subordinate kingships in Macedonia (2.99.2). The granting of *archai* to the princes of the Argead

<sup>5</sup>O. Abel, *Makedonien vor König Philipp* (Leipzig 1847) 166.

<sup>6</sup>See esp. D. Raymond, *Macedonian Regal Coinage to 413 B.C.* (New York 1953, American Numismatic Society Numismatic Notes and Monographs 126) 148-165. There are, for instance, no coins with ΑΑΚ or ΦΙΑ to put beside those which have Γ, Γ'ΕΡ or Γ'ΕΡΔΙΚ (Raymond gives those with Α to Alexander [150], and the single letter would hardly be chosen to distinguish Alcetas from his brother[s]).

<sup>7</sup>In 2.100.1-2 Thucydides summarizes Archelaus' achievement, but says nothing about his character. Plato is interested in his character rather than his achievement. There is no contradiction in the two accounts.

<sup>8</sup>For useful discussion see J. Papastavru, *Hai Archai tes Basileias Perdikkou tou B'* (Athens 1939) 200 ff.

<sup>9</sup>Thuc. 2.99.3; Justinus 8.4.

house might have been no more than an extension of the system of divided responsibility which Alexander had felt it politic to create after the Persian Wars. He may be open to criticism for failing to see that such a system required a strong central authority (which he himself certainly was), and for misjudging the capacity of his eldest (?) son, but the policy itself was not necessarily ill-conceived nor stultifying. It would appear that on Alexander's death Perdiccas was unable to win the acclaim of the whole country, and consequently there began a period of internal strife, lasting possibly until the late forties, from which Perdiccas ultimately emerged as the victor. Even then the opposition was merely driven underground, where it smouldered until fanned into flame again by the rival Greek powers before and during the Peloponnesian War.<sup>10</sup> Sadly for Macedonia, Alexander had only weakened where he hoped to strengthen, and, as with his more illustrious namesake of a later generation, a system worked for only as long as he was there to make it work. As soon as he died, unity very quickly lapsed into discord and internal strife. We have no idea of the location of Alcetas' *arche*, but Thucydides does provide some information—albeit inconclusive—on that of Philip (2.100.3). Sitalces' force moves into the area of the *arche* from Doberos. Doberos is fairly securely located close to the Axios, and Gomme's second thoughts on the extent of the *arche* are probably correct.<sup>11</sup> It appears to have included the Axios valley, no doubt an area of high population, perhaps coming down to the sea. The strategic importance of the territory is striking and makes it most unlikely that Philip received it from anyone but Alexander. Perdiccas himself would hardly have permitted a brother to wield control over such an important district, if he had had any say in the matter.

Thucydides tells us that enmity sprang up between the Athenians and Perdiccas, who had recently been their friend and ally, "because the Athenians had made an alliance with Philip, his brother, and with Derdas, both of whom were opposed to him" (1.57.2). The implication of this is that in the thirties Perdiccas showed himself to be unreliable as an ally. The Athenians, feeling that war with Sparta was likely within a decade, decided that they must have on the Macedonian throne someone whom they could trust, for the sake both of timber supply and their general position, offensive and defensive, in the NW Aegean.<sup>12</sup> They then began

<sup>10</sup>As a result of these rapidly developing rivalries between the branches of the Argeid House, the transition from one king to the next was to become increasingly troublesome in the late fifth and fourth centuries. Unity or disunity stemmed directly from strength or weakness on the throne.

<sup>11</sup>Gomme, *Commentary* on 1.57.3 and 2.100.3.

<sup>12</sup>I do not hold the view that Athen's NW policy of 436–434 was largely unrelated to her view of the overall situation in Greece at this time.

to encourage the potential opposition in the hope that a domestic upheaval would bring about Perdiccas' downfall and his successor would be more sympathetic to their needs and objectives.

What had Perdiccas done, or failed to do, to make the Athenians give up on him and promote the cause of his brother? We hear almost nothing of Atheno-Macedonian relations in the latter years of Alexander and the early years of Perdiccas. The Athenians, preoccupied elsewhere in the fifties and early forties, seem to have refrained from thoughts of confrontation after Cimon's acquittal.<sup>13</sup> Athenian timber requirements in this period may have been as great as at any previous time.<sup>14</sup> The Tribute Lists suggest that Athens was showing forbearance in the Thermaic Gulf and offer no hint of a clash of interests.<sup>15</sup> A fragment of Theopompus in Strabo offers one reference to Atheno-Macedonian affairs; it tells of the "movement of Histiaeans to Macedonia by agreement when Pericles was reducing Euboea."<sup>16</sup> If Theopompus is right—and at least the expulsion of the native Euboean population is confirmed by Thucydides (1.114.3)—the date must be in 446 or 445. What the terms of the agreement were, it is not easy to say, but it seems most unlikely that the pact incorporated in *IG* 1<sup>2</sup> 71 is in fact this.<sup>17</sup> It looks like something fairly informal: Perdiccas perhaps asked for Athenian permission to receive and settle the refugees, anxious at this time not to give offence nor to precipitate a recrudescence of ill-feeling by rash action. He would have been very much aware that the Athenians were about to be released from their southern commitments and might well turn their attentions to the north. Provocation of any kind was obviously undesirable.

A major gap in our knowledge of the period 450–435 is the rise to power of the Odrysian ruler, Sitalces, whose activities must have threatened both the eastern frontier of Macedonia and Athenian interests in Thrace. We do not know the date of his accession nor the history of his early relations with other powers. Thucydides says that in the days of his successor, Seuthes, a tribute of four hundred talents in gold and silver from both foreign and Greek cities, along with a like amount in presents, was the source of Odrysian wealth (2.97.3). Both Athenians and Macedonians

<sup>13</sup>Plut. *Cimon* 14.2, 463 or 462 B.C.

<sup>14</sup>The scale of Athenian naval operations in the early fifties probably matched that of the years of Salamis and Eurymedon. The allies' commutation from ships to money may or may not have increased the demand for Macedonian timber. We do not know if hitherto ship-contributing members of the League had been drawing on the same source of supply as it appears Athens was. Evidence for the Athenian use of northern timber in the later fifth century is to be found in *IG* 1<sup>2</sup> 71, Thuc. 4.108, *IG* 1<sup>2</sup> 105, Andoc. 2.11; for recent discussion see C. F. Edson, *AncMac* 25–26.

<sup>15</sup>*ATL* 3.318–319.

<sup>16</sup>*FGrHist* 115 F 387.

<sup>17</sup>*Pace* Raymond (above, note 6) 149.

clearly had to tread with wary diplomatic steps in the presence of such military and economic strength close to their borders or possessions. The sporadic appearance of Thracian cities in the Tribute Lists and the known presence of Athenian squadrons at Eion and Tenedos in the early forties suggest a readiness for military operations along the Thracian coast.<sup>18</sup> After the revolts of Samos and Byzantium the Athenians may have come to some accommodation with Sitalces: the *ataktōi poleis* of 435/4, all in the Thracian area, probably reflect in their status the results of diplomatic action and mark concessions to Sitalces at a time when Athenian relations with Macedonia were deteriorating and war in the south looked to be coming closer.<sup>19</sup> In the first year of the Peloponnesian War this agreement was to be consolidated by a more formal alliance, thanks to the good offices of Nymphodorus of Abdera, Sitalces' brother-in-law and Athenian *proxenos*.<sup>20</sup> An unpredictable Macedonia made such a rapprochement well-advised for the Athenians.

The unopposed (as far as we know) foundation of Amphipolis in 437/436 is obviously a landmark in Atheno-Macedonian-Thracian relations.<sup>21</sup> Both Macedonia and the Thracian tribes must have reacted to this event or accepted it in accordance with some prearrangement. Nesselhauf may well be right in assuming that the Athenians obtained from the Thracians an admission of claim to parts of the Strymon Valley in return for concessions elsewhere, e.g., the Thracian coast. This would certainly explain the apparent absence of any Thracian attempt to obstruct the project. With guarantees of non-interference from Thrace the Athenians could be more cavalier in their attitude to Macedonia.<sup>22</sup>

It is probable that the alliance with Macedonia to which Thucydides refers in 1.53.3 is part of the general settlement of the north in the early

<sup>18</sup>For detailed study of the evidence see *ATL* 3.59–63.

<sup>19</sup>F. Lepper, *JHS* 82 (1962) 35–38.

<sup>20</sup>Thuc. 2.29.1; *Staatsverträge* 165. There has been some discussion about the relevance of the cult of Bendis to the evolution of the Athens-Thrace relationship, e.g., W. Ferguson, *Hesperia* Suppl. 8 (1949) 131–162, and J. Pečírka, *The Formula for the Grant of Enktesis in Attic Inscriptions* (Prague 1966, Acta Universitatis Carolinae) 122–130. The latter's view is that, although the oldest reference to the officially recognized cult of Bendis is in the accounts of the treasurers of The Other Gods for 429–428, the *enktesis* for building a temple to Bendis was granted to the Thracians earlier. Even if this is true, it can still be maintained that new emphasis was given the cult in the circumstances of the current relationship. Aristoph. *Acharn.* 140–150 certainly pokes fun at the Athens-Thrace relationship.

<sup>21</sup>I feel that Deane's argument for dating the foundation to the spring of 436 is strong: P. Deane, *Thucydides' Dates 465–431 B.C.* (Toronto 1972) 14.

<sup>22</sup>*Klio* 30 (1933) 58. The uncertainty surrounding the location, and date of foundation, of the Athenian settlement at Brea renders any discussion of its effects upon Atheno-Macedonian relations more speculative than much of this material. For the best discussions of this problem see H. B. Mattingly, *CQ* 16 (1966) 179; B. D. Meritt, *GRBS* 8 (1967) 49–51.

thirties. It may antedate the foundation of Amphipolis or it may postdate it. This alliance combined with the Sitalces agreement established Athens, albeit an intruder in the north, in a position in which she held a sort of balance of power. Theoretically she could threaten Macedonian with Thracian and Thracian with Macedonian. Amphipolis by its location was a symbol of this position; from it Athens could move east or west, as circumstances required. This end result might be regarded as a product of calculated diplomacy which exploited the situation to the maximum advantage of Athens.

The problem of *IG* 1<sup>2</sup> 71 is insoluble in the present state of the text. Datings have ranged from as early as 446/5 to as late as 415/4, with 423/2 the most popular. The related problem of identifying the inscription with one of the treaties and agreements to which Thucydides often makes no more than passing reference poses an equally frustrating question. *ATL* favours 436/5 for the main part of the text and relates it to the pre-war alliance of Thucydides.<sup>23</sup> The main argument is that the content of the inscription is much more suitable to an original alliance than to any patching up of differences toward the end of the Archidamian War. In the list of names of Macedonian princes attached to the alliance the editors restore "Philip, son of Alexander, Amyntas, son of Philip" to fill out the line to the *stoichedon* length of one hundred letters. The inclusion of Philip is only possible if the alliance is dated before 429, because indications are that he was dead by the time of Sitalces' invasion in that year.<sup>24</sup> Unlike those who favour a later date, they are not concerned to put the inscription treaty into any known context of hostility between Perdiccas and Arrhabaeus; they see no difficulty in hypothesizing one in the middle thirties.

Mattingly, arguing for a later date, has seen line 32 of the main text as decisive against any date before 432/1. The line, with some restoration, contains an Athenian undertaking not to march against any town which Perdiccas has taken. This, he thinks, makes little sense in a middle thirties context.<sup>25</sup> Similarly the later mention of a blockade which the Athenians lifted is, he believes, difficult to date before the outbreak of war, but fits well a context of either 424/3 or 417/6. In the list of Macedonian princes he proposes the restoration "Aeropus the son of Philip, Alexander, the son of Alcetas." One might add that the exclusive timber rights granted to Athens in return for the recognition of the then boundaries of

<sup>23</sup>For general discussion see *ATL* 3.313, note 61; *Staatsverträge* 186.

<sup>24</sup>Thuc. 2.100.3. Sitalces' intention to put Amyntas, son of Philip, on the Macedonian throne strongly implies that the father was by that time dead.

<sup>25</sup>*BCH* 92 (1968) 472-477. It is true, of course, that Perdiccas may have been taking towns from some unknown rival in some unknown war in the middle thirties, but I still think there is more relevance here to a known situation in the twenties than to a putative one in the thirties. I do not find J. Papastavru's contrary arguments in *Hellenica* 15 (1957) 262 convincing.

the Macedonian kingdom are putatively more intelligible in war time than in peace time.

Mattingly's arguments deter us from any too facile identification, and it is safer to leave the question open. I find it hard to accept Geyer's assumption of a state of war between Athens and Perdiccas from 436 and his dating of the inscription treaty to before the foundation of Amphipolis.<sup>26</sup> The arguments for a date in the twenties or later seem stronger than those against, and the limits set by Mattingly appear acceptable.

What happened after the Thucydides treaty to cause Perdiccas to abandon Athens and the Athenians to enter negotiations with his rivals? The Athenians may have overplayed their hand in the north-west, taking advantage either of loop-holes in the treaty or Perdiccas' preoccupations to establish themselves more strongly in the Thermaic Gulf. The initial assessment of Methone in 434 could have been particularly irksome; and the general increase in the number of towns assessed and the amounts did not augur well for the integrity of Macedonia's borders.<sup>27</sup> The Athenians may have taken a calculated line here. Determined to strengthen their hold on the Chalcidic peninsula and relying on Thracian adherence to the recently concluded treaty, they chanced their luck with Macedonia's reactions. In the event they drove their luck too far: Macedonia's reaction was strong and unfavourable, and the Athenians were compelled to counter it by entering Macedonian domestic politics and seeking to undermine Perdiccas' royal power.

This, of course, is no more than speculation. All that Thucydides tells us is that Perdiccas became an enemy of the Athenians because they had entered into alliance with his brother, Philip, and with Derdas. It seems highly improbable, however, that the Athenians would have done this without some marked deterioration in the relationship with Perdiccas. Whether the "lies from Perdiccas" in the fragment of Hermippus' *Phormophoroi* belong to the pre-war period, it is not possible to say, but they may have begun early and from them could have stemmed the Athenians' disenchantment with their purveyor.<sup>28</sup> Repeated attempts have been made to straitjacket IG 1<sup>2</sup> 53 into a fragment of an alliance between Athens and Philip, but Merritt has shown that the restoration  $\phi\iota\lambda[\sigma]$  is more likely than  $\Phi\iota\lambda[\iota\pi\pi\sigma]$ , particularly in view of the *stoichedon* pattern. He interprets the decree as part of the terms of a harsh settlement following the subjugation of an unknown rebellious ally.<sup>29</sup> Little more can be profitably said.

<sup>26</sup>F. Geyer, *Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II* (Munich 1930) 50 ff.

<sup>27</sup>ATL 3.318-319.

<sup>28</sup>Fr. 63.8 (Edmonds 1.304). The reference to Corcyra and the mention of Sitalces make a date of 428 or 427 most likely for the first performance of the play.

<sup>29</sup>B. D. Merritt, *AJA* 68 (1964) 312; but now see G. A. Papantaniou, "Athenians and the Macedonians (IG I<sup>2</sup>, 53 and Thuc. I, 57, 2-3)," in *Acta of the Fifth International Congress of Greek and Latin Epigraphy* (Oxford 1971) 43-45.

Thucydides' narrative of fighting in the north, which immediately preceded the outbreak of general hostilities, is not without its difficulties.<sup>30</sup> Perdiccas' first action after the break with Athens was to send an embassy to Sparta "to try and involve the Athenians in a war with the Peloponnesians. He was endeavouring to win over Corinth in order to bring about the revolt of Potidaea. He also approached the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace and the Bottiaeans to persuade them to join in the revolt" (1.57.5). News of Perdiccas' counter-measures to the threat of Athenian force arrived at Athens at a time when the general, Archestratus, was about to set sail with thirty ships and one thousand hoplites for a campaign against his territory. The Athenians reacted by adjusting Archestratus' mandate and instructing him to take hostages from Potidaea, destroy its walls, and deter the Chalcidic towns from revolt. All this, with perhaps one minor exception, is intelligible. Perdiccas is aiming at the establishment of an anti-Athenian coalition in the north, which will eliminate all further possibility of encroachment in the Thermaic Gulf and ensure the integrity of Macedonia's boundaries. Recent Athenian policy toward him, which seemed to be encouraging fragmentation and prejudicing unity, has made him desperate. His only hope of survival is an anti-Athenian bloc with the power of Sparta and Corinth in long-range support. The one difficulty of this section is the smallness of the force with which Archestratus was being sent to attack Macedonia. It looks much more like the sort of force which would be sent to discipline rebellious subjects. It is true that it did subsequently attack westwards into Macedonia, but only when Philip joined with it and Derdas' brothers were making a synchronized incursion from the east as part of the total operation (1.59.2). Thucydides may have incorrectly assigned as original orders what the expedition did ultimately encompass, but largely as a strategic reaction to developing circumstances. A second Athenian force, forty ships and two thousand hoplites under the command of Callias, was sent north when news arrived that Aristeus and his Corinthians had appeared at Potidaea. They found that the first force had already taken Therme and was engaged in the siege of Pydna. This is a surprising achievement for such a small force, and we can only assume that the pressure which was being put on Perdiccas by the brothers of Derdas was compelling him to keep the bulk of his forces in the western part of the country. The *συμμαχία ἀναγκαία* of Thucydides 1.61.3 must have been concluded in circumstances in which both contestants thought their respective interests best served by a cessation of hostilities. Perdiccas, hard-pressed on two fronts, would have been primarily concerned to

<sup>30</sup>Thuc. 1.56–61. There are problems with both the sequence and the relative timing of events, but they do not substantially affect the argument. Perdiccas may have hoped for a complete elimination of Athenian presence from the Chalcidic Peninsula.



hold on to his kingship, tenure of which was being placed in increasing jeopardy as the fighting went on. His main chance of success was to have his hands free to fight his rivals and to deprive them of Athenian support. The Athenians had to meet the threat of the loss of the northern part of their empire. Unless they sloughed the entanglement with Macedonia, they were going to have to dip dangerously into their financial reserves and military effectives, and for little more than a holding action. Nothing positive could be achieved in the larger context of the struggle with Sparta.<sup>31</sup>

This alliance did not, however, end Athenian intrigue with Philip. Perdiccas may have assumed that it would, and his subsequent defection is possibly explicable in terms of Athens' duplicity rather than his own. Six hundred cavalry from the force of Philip and Pausanias joined the Athenian army as it was moving from Macedonia into Chalcidice (1.61.4). Perdiccas' reaction to what he may have justifiably regarded as an act of "bad faith" is not unexpected: "He immediately defected from his alliance with the Athenians for a second time and allied himself with the Potidaeans." He was chosen to command the cavalry arm of the anti-Athenian forces, but subsequently for reasons not specified he deputed Iolaus to command in his place (1.62.2). A little later we hear of two hundred Macedonian horse from Perdiccas' army in Olynthos, part of a force ordered to make a flank or rear attack after Aristeus and the Athenians had come to grips. The plan was frustrated when Callias disposed his own Macedonian cavalry to guard against such a tactic. Cynical calculations and military expediency may have determined Callias' dispositions on this occasion. Perdiccas' revived intrigues had made it necessary for the Athenians to involve him in domestic problems on a scale which would allow him no time nor inclination for external meddling. Pitting Macedonian against Macedonian would fragment further the military potential of the country and undermine Perdiccas' ability to influence events.<sup>32</sup>

The problem of timber-supplies had perhaps become less pressing for the Athenians since the new friendship with the Thracian tribal group had been forged. Various aspects of this important association are illustrated by the handing over to the Athenians of Spartan and Corinthian envoys on their way to Persia and the Athenian decision to give more official status to the cult of the Thracian deity, Bendis.<sup>33</sup> No longer were the Athenians compelled to determine their policy toward Macedonia by

<sup>31</sup>I concede that Thucydides might have seen this in a different light and given it a less negative assessment. For the cost of the Potidaea operation see Thuc. 2.70.2; for Athenian casualties, *IG* 1<sup>2</sup> 945.

<sup>32</sup>It is possible, of course, that the disposition was made necessary by the lack of other cavalry.

<sup>33</sup>Thuc. 2.67.2. See note 20 above.

logistic considerations; they were now free to handle Perdiccas by direct and blunt action.

A second reconciliation between Perdiccas and the Athenians comes as no surprise. The threat of combined action by Athens and Thrace must have quickly cooled Perdiccas' ardour for further campaigning. The two foes are brought to the bargaining table by the good offices of Nymphodorus, and in return for Perdiccas' undertaking to support the Athenians against the Chalcidians they handed over Therme to him. Perdiccas offered quick proof of his change of heart by joining with Phormio in an attack upon the Chalcidians, the result of which, not reported by Thucydides (2.29.6), appears to have been inconclusive. Two years later, however, when the Athenians launched a further attack, neither Perdiccas nor Sitalces is reported to have participated. One should not perhaps infer too much from this, as their aid may not have been requested, but a little later Perdiccas is reported to have sent one thousand men to assist the Spartan Cnemus, in Acarnania "without the knowledge of the Athenians" (2.79—81).

What could have produced this further change of attitude? If there is any consistency in Perdiccas' actions, it is his determination to maintain the unity and independence of his country. He was not the last ruler to be involved on the peripheries of a conflict between great powers without knowing which of the two was likely to win and, therefore, which side it was in his interest to join. The temptation to fence-sit is almost irresistible in those circumstances. Perdiccas himself may well have been in two minds about which side he wanted to win. Economically Athens could do him much more good than Sparta, but Athenian imperialism always had to be feared. An Athenian victory and consequent Athenian domination of the Greek world boded no good for the autonomy of Macedonia. Sparta on the other hand was not likely to infringe Macedonian sovereignty, if the victor, but a Spartan victory might reduce the demand for Macedonian timber.

The aid to Cnemus must stem from his belief that the military balance had tipped in favour of Sparta. Athens had had little success in the war so far and latterly both her capacity and her will to fight had been seriously diminished by the outbreak of plague. If he had by this time heard rumblings out of Thrace, he must have had reason to believe that the threat of Thracian action against him was not immediate. Perdiccas, without being possessed of Alexander's dynamism, is a true son in his determination to run with the fox and hunt with the hounds. Such a policy may make it difficult to gain much, but it also makes it hard to lose all.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup>If we can believe most, if not all, of what Herodotus tells us, Alexander's policy during the Persian Wars was a masterful display of ambiguous opportunism.

His calculations with respect to Thrace were obviously cut fine, or, as is more likely, were simply lucky. Shortly after the Acarnanian fiasco and perhaps in part because of it Sitalces and his Odrysiens moved against Macedonia, "to exact one promise and to fulfill another" (2.95.1). Perdicas had made some unknown undertaking in return for the Thracian contribution to his reconciliation with Athens; Sitalces himself had pledged to the Athenians that he would end the Chalcidic war on the eastern (Thrace-ward) side of the peninsula. Sitalces brought with him Philip's son, Amyntas, with the intention of putting him on the Macedonian throne in Perdicas' stead, and was accompanied by an Athenian embassy under Hagnon. The Macedonians, not strong enough to challenge a force of such size in open battle, withdrew to walled strongholds and permitted their lands to be ravaged. Only a few cavalry raids were attempted, but were quickly discontinued because of numerical inferiority (2.95—100).<sup>35</sup> The Athenians were obligated to support the invasion, and undoubtedly one of the functions of Hagnon's embassy was to coordinate this support.

It was Perdicas' good-fortune to be let off much more lightly on this occasion than he had reason to expect. Sitalces had left it late in the season to conduct his invasion, he lacked the type of troops and equipment to lay successful siege to the strong-points where the Macedonians had taken refuge, and he was soon hard-pressed by lack of essential supplies. At this point, Thucydides tells us, Sitalces was persuaded by Seuthes, later his successor, to abandon the invasion and to evacuate Macedonia. Perdicas, who never allowed grass to grow under his diplomatic feet, had, it seems, gone to work on Seuthes, and by promising him his sister in marriage and handing over a large monetary bribe had prevailed upon him to convince Sitalces of the purposelessness of the whole enterprise (2.101.5).<sup>36</sup>

Sitalces, in fact, seems to have had only minimal interest in the project. He would not have been blind to the fact that the advantages stemming from his attack would on balance accrue to the Athenians rather than himself, and, whereas he might have been prepared to stick at the campaign longer if the Athenians had appeared to support him, their failure to

<sup>35</sup>Thuc. 2.95.1. J. Papastavru in *Hellenica* 15 (1957) 261 suggests that Perdicas' unfulfilled promise was to restore Philip to his *arche*. I prefer the scholiast *ad loc.*, who says that a financial deal was involved.

<sup>36</sup>The event is oddly reminiscent of Alexander I, his sister, Gygaea, and the Persian grandee, Bubares, in Hdt. 5.17–21. It would obviously be dangerous to use either the one or the other as an argument against the historicity of the earlier or the later event.

The Athenians may have thought that their interests in the north were best served by hostility between Macedonia and Thrace. This would not be incompatible with the thesis that they tended to play one against the other. See the recent discussion by G. Mihailov in *AncMac* 80.

do so must have made him more than a little suspicious that he was being used. Athenian delinquency on this occasion is hard to understand. It is true that the plague and its aftermath inhibited Athenian military planning, but a great opportunity was presented to them here. The recalcitrant north might have been brought back securely under Athens' control, Chalcidice recovered, and a more tractable king placed upon the Macedonian throne. For reasons that can only be guessed, the Athenians allowed this chance to slip through their fingers.

As things were, however, Perdiccas seemed to be encouraged to new defiance and outright provocation by what had happened. The quick retirement of Sitalces probably strengthened his precarious hold on the throne, for he would undoubtedly have represented it as a product of military and diplomatic genius. The absence of any Athenian support would have tempted him to rash and premature conclusions about the city's will and ability to continue the war. The Methone decrees, the *ATL* dating of which survives Mattingly's strictures, reveal something of Perdiccas' new confidence.<sup>37</sup> Whatever the circumstances under which Methone first appears in the Tribute Lists in 434, the decrees of the middle twenties attest Macedonian harassment of the city. They also reveal considerable diplomatic traffic between Athens and Macedonia.<sup>38</sup> In general the Athenians were restrained in their approach, perhaps as a result of actual or expected preoccupation elsewhere. The Mytilene revolt, the campaigns in the north-west, Pylos-Sphacteria, had placed strains on man-power and ships. Thracian timber was perhaps not so immediately available as a substitute for Macedonian after the debacle of Sitalces' attack. Athens certainly sought to avoid a decisive break with Perdiccas during the protracted negotiations. Methone had to be protected, but not at the cost of war. Conveniently for Athens the Pylos success came at the right time. The ground was not quite swept from under Perdiccas' feet, but he could hardly maintain the same attitude after such a signal demonstration of Athens' recovery. If Athens had accepted Sparta's peace offer, he might have found himself confronted with her whole military strength. He was probably forced by apprehensions such as these to soften his bargaining line and agree to a final settlement of the problem. Casson may well be right in suggesting that the terms which were ultimately agreed upon were not dissimilar from those which the Athenians had contracted with the Thracians: a compact whereby the inhabitants of Methone and other communities on the west shore of the Thermaic Gulf were obligated both to the Athenians and to Perdiccas.<sup>39</sup> Thucydides implies that Greeks in Macedonia were bound

<sup>37</sup>*CQ* 11 (1961) 154-165.

<sup>38</sup>*ATL* 3.323; Andoc. 2.11 implies that his father served on such an embassy.

<sup>39</sup>S. Casson, *Macedonia, Thrace, and Illyria* (Oxford 1926) 193 ff.

to perform military service for Macedonian kings and, although we do not hear of any commutations of such service into monetary payment, it is not impossible that this could be done (4.124.1).

Perdiccas, so frequently the victim of mutually exclusive considerations, was apparently quick to regret the accommodation which he had made. Domestic troubles had occurred, or were about to occur, to compound his uncertainty. Arrhabaeus was seeking independence from the central authority at Aegae. Perdiccas knew from past experience what this augured: pressure or threat from the outside that, if he failed to meet demands, the defector would be supported. Only one course was open to him, particularly as the peace which had seemed so dangerous now looked unlikely. He joined with those Thracian communities which were already in revolt from Athens in applying for military assistance to the Spartans, "apprehensive because of his old differences with the Athenians, although not openly in arms against them, and above all eager to reduce Arrhabaeus, the king of the Lyncestians" (4.79.2). The Athenians were quick to hold Perdiccas responsible for Brasidas' expedition to the north and to declare him their enemy. On his arrival Brasidas immediately demonstrated to Perdiccas that he was not in the north simply to further Macedonian objectives: he insisted that a diplomatic approach be made to Arrhabaeus before he began military operations. Thucydides indicates that Arrhabaeus had made overtures and shown himself prepared to submit the dispute to the Spartan's arbitration (4.83.3). Perdiccas objected, but was overruled. A parley was held and Brasidas withdrew his troops from the borders of Arrhabaeus' kingdom without invading. Perdiccas, obviously unhappy at this development, then reduced the scale of maintenance of Brasidas' force from one half to one third.<sup>40</sup> Gomme suggests that Perdiccas had not come off too badly, because Arrhabaeus had presumably bound himself to refrain from hostile action against him. The danger was still there, but the threat of immediate war was in abeyance.<sup>41</sup>

Despite the logistic sanctions Perdiccas does not appear to have felt a lasting grudge against Brasidas, for he is mentioned in connection with the fall of Amphipolis and assists in the settlement of newly-acquired territories.<sup>42</sup> Of course, the Spartan star was now very much in the ascendant. Athens' failure at Megara had been followed by the disastrous campaign in Boeotia and the crippling losses in the north. Spartan fortunes had reached their nadir at Pylos-Sphacteria, but much had happened since to restore them. Perdiccas' behaviour during the war may resist

<sup>40</sup>Thuc. 4.82-83. J. Papastavru, *Hellenica* 15 (1957) 265, thinks that Perdiccas may have suggested the N campaign to the Spartans.

<sup>41</sup>Gomme, *Commentary* on 4.83.6.

<sup>42</sup>Thuc. 4.103.3; 107.3.

rational analysis, but one thing of which we can be sure is that he wanted to be on the winning side at its end. Cooperation with Sparta at this time boded well for his future.

The agreement between Brasidas and Arrhabaeus was short-lived, for Thucydides goes on to describe a second campaign conducted by Brasidas and Perdiccas against the Lyncestian ruler (4.124). He offers no explanation of the renewed hostilities, although there is some inscriptional evidence that the Athenians had been in contact with Arrhabaeus, hoping to use him as a counter to Brasidas' and Perdiccas' ambitions.<sup>43</sup> This hardly seems the whole story, however, for Brasidas was forced into a dangerous division of his forces in order to conduct the campaign and was continually looking over his shoulder against the danger of Athenian counter-offensive in Chalcidice (4.124.4). Either Brasidas had obligated himself to Perdiccas in return for support at Amphipolis and elsewhere, or—and this is more likely—Brasidas was blackmailed into the campaign by Perdiccas' threat to withhold all supplies. The course of the campaign was odd. After an initial victory, Brasidas and Perdiccas did not follow it up, but waited two or three days for some Illyrian mercenaries whom Perdiccas had engaged. After they failed to appear, Perdiccas favoured an advance, but Brasidas, not wishing to put too much distance between himself and the vulnerable Chalcidice, advised retirement. While they were wrangling about this, news arrived that the mercenaries had in fact joined with Arrhabaeus. The combined Macedonian-Spartan force was now in a most dangerous position and retreat was the only expedient. Thucydides informs us that the Macedonian element panicked and fled in disorder without any effort to coordinate retirement with the Spartans (4.125.2). Brasidas' troops were severely harassed by attacking Lyncestians and Illyrians, but his cool leadership and the discipline of his soldiers enabled the force to extricate itself without serious losses. The Spartans were not unnaturally enraged by what appeared to them to be overt desertion on the part of their allies and vented their anger upon them. Perdiccas' reaction was predictable: "from this moment Perdiccas first looked upon Brasidas as an enemy and for the future felt a hatred for the Peloponnesians, which was incompatible with his attitude toward the Athenians. Abandoning his natural interests, he immediately sought ways of reconciling himself to the latter and ridding himself of the former."<sup>44</sup>

Once again Perdiccas was on the point of switching allegiance. His intentions were perhaps a result not simply of the breakdown in military

<sup>43</sup>See C. F. Edson, *AncMac* 34, citing *SEG* 10.88.

<sup>44</sup>Thuc. 4.128.5. Thucydides seems to believe that Perdiccas' interests demanded steady cooperation with Sparta. This view may oversimplify the position of Macedonia in the conflict and put undue emphasis on the circumstances of Atheno-Macedonian hostility at the outbreak of the war.

cooperation with Brasidas, but of the mounting scale of Athenian counter-action in the north (cf. 4.129). While Brasidas had been preoccupied in Lyncestis, Mende had been recovered and siege-lines established around Scione. It was at this juncture that Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenians and made an "agreement" with them. This is the "agreement" which has been the popular candidate for identification with the treaty incorporated in *IG* I<sup>2</sup>71.<sup>45</sup> After the negotiations had been completed, Cleon requested Perdiccas to send troops to take part in the Amphipolis campaign. We do not hear of them in the subsequent action, but it does not follow, of course, that they were not there. The renewal of friendly relations presumably meant that timber supplies were once again safeguarded (as *IG* I<sup>2</sup>71 indicates), and this may have relieved Athens of a pressing concern.<sup>46</sup> Perdiccas certainly performed one service of note for his "new" allies: preventing reinforcements from reaching Brasidas by using his influence with the Thessalians and persuading them to refuse passage across their territory. It is true that he did not do this spontaneously, but "on the bidding of Nicias," but he did it, and such a thing was rare enough in Perdiccas' relationship with Athens (4.132.2).

The Peace of Nicias, especially the term which provided for the restoration of Amphipolis to the Athenians, must have been somewhat disturbing to Perdiccas. He was probably relieved when the term was not implemented nor the Athenian position in the north restored to its pre-war strength. The removal of Athenians from strong-points on his borders would leave him much freer to deal with any repeated threat from the inside, and, as events were soon to prove, Arrhabaeus was by no means content with a dependent status.

Athens' financial and military recovery after the Archidamian War was astonishingly rapid. Despite the economic benefits which no doubt accrued to him, Perdiccas could hardly have regarded it with equanimity. The shattering of the anti-Spartan coalition at Mantinea may have abruptly halted Athenian efforts to infiltrate the Peloponnese, but cost Athens little in money and man-power. Fear of where her notorious restlessness might next take her may explain why Perdiccas was willing

<sup>45</sup>Thuc. 4.132.1. If the Perdiccas who is forced to mint a bronze coinage at the time of an Illyrian war is our Perdiccas and not Perdiccas III, much desired economic relief could be won by a settlement with Athens. See Polyaeus 4.10.

<sup>46</sup>The treaty between Athens and Bottiaea, recorded in *IG* I<sup>2</sup> 90 and dated to 422 (B. D. Meritt, *AJA* 29 [1925] 29 ff.), is probably part of the Atheno-Macedonian reconciliation, *Staatsverträge* 187. Athenian willingness to do business with Perdiccas at this time was perhaps made the keener by the recent accession of Seuthes, Perdiccas' brother-in-law, to the Odrysian throne (Thuc. 4.101.5). The Athenians would probably have preferred Sadocus, Sitalces' pro-Athenian (?) son, on whom they had conferred their citizenship (Thuc. 2.67.2). Intrigue on the part of Perdiccas to promote the succession of Seuthes is not unlikely.

to listen to Spartan and Argive ambassadors in 417 (5.80.2). Perdiccas was clearly reluctant to commit himself without possibility of retraction, and indeed the situation was one in which he had to be extremely cautious. A *συννομία* with Peloponnesian states was all very well, but it was unlikely that it would be of much practical assistance in the event of hostile Athenian reaction. There could hardly be a repeat of the Brasidas coup, the Athenian fleet was once again too strong to be challenged, and Sparta's domestic position was by no means as authoritative as it had been in the Archidamian War. In any case, internal affairs at Argos were most unstable and the Argive-Spartan alliance built on the shallowest of foundations. Perdiccas' obvious hesitancy can be appreciated on this occasion more than on others.<sup>47</sup> If Perdiccas and Athens were to become further embroiled in the north, the only help that the Macedonians might receive would be Spartan action, or threat of it, in the south.

The Athenians, who by now must have been unsurprised at anything that came out of Macedonia, reacted to Perdiccas' limited duplicity by establishing a blockade around the Macedonian coast and sending vigorous protests. Thucydides reveals that the Athenians had been on the point of sending an expedition against the Chalcidians and Amphipolis and were relying on Perdiccas' support (5.83.4). It seems likely, although the historian does not say so, that the Spartans initiated the diplomatic contact in order to keep Perdiccas at least neutral in the event of such a campaign. The political circumstances of the times must have made it difficult for Athens to do any military planning in secret.

The only reference in Thucydides to these desultory hostilities is his mention of a raid which the Athenians made from Methone (6.7.3). Macedonian exiles are said to have been part of the force. Presumably these are one-time adherents of Philip and Amyntas who had taken refuge at Athens or elsewhere in the empire, e.g., Methone, after the collapse of movements against Perdiccas' throne. The Spartans tried to persuade the Thracian Chalcidians to cooperate with Perdiccas against Athens, but they refused, preferring to continue the truce with them (6.7.4). The raid seems to have had little purpose except to keep Perdiccas "honest" and discourage him from hostile designs.

Surprisingly, at the end of 414, we find Perdiccas again associated with the Athenians. He joins with Euetion and a force of Thracians in an attack on Amphipolis (7.9). Under what circumstances he transferred his sympathies yet again, it is impossible to say. He may have been impressed by the size and importance of the Sicilian expedition and simultaneously disenchanted by Sparta's lack of concern and interest in what was happening in the north. It is conceivable that particularly lucrative ship-

<sup>47</sup>Thuc. *ibid.*: "He did not immediately defect from the Athenians . . .," *Staatsverträge* 194.



building or timber-supplying contracts came his way in connection with the Sicilian attack. Economics may have dictated a policy which otherwise he would have eschewed. Athens was always going to be the best customer for what Perdiccas had to sell, and that factor could not be ignored for too long.

The date of Perdiccas' death is put by most sources earlier than Thucydides makes it possible, e.g., *Marmor Parium* 420/19, Diodorus 416(?).<sup>48</sup> There is no evidence that his death was other than natural. Plato offers the only epitaph from antiquity: putting him in a group with Periander, Xerxes, and Ismenias, he described him as a man who reduced everything, even morality, to the level of commerce (*Resp.* 336a).

In assessing Perdiccas we must slough off the prejudices of contemporary Athenian historians and comedians. Perdiccas did not conceive his role in the Greek world as one of altruistic service to the cause of Athenian imperialism; and this is what most Athenians seem to have expected of him. Athens was undoubtedly Perdiccas' best customer for timber, but the king was not prepared simply to play the puppet and sacrifice the integrity of his country for the commercial opportunity (*pace* Plato). Under certain circumstances the economic consideration could tip the balance, but not at the cost of independence and national integrity. There is every reason to suppose that the whole history of the Atheno-Macedonian relationship during the war would have been very different, if the Athenians had not been so insensitively provocative in the thirties and had not renewed their provocations subsequently. The presence of Athenians on the Thermaic Gulf and the Strymon was bound to make diplomatic exchange with Macedonia a very delicate operation, but the problems were not insurmountable, if the Athenians showed some forbearance, as indeed they did in their dealings with the Odrysian king over the Thracian coast. After an initially hostile reaction, Perdiccas might well have been content with an Athenian *point d'appui* on the Strymon, for it was some protection against Thracian attack, but he was certainly not going to tolerate the kind of external meddling into his domestic affairs which the Athenians from time to time engaged in. Careful diplomacy might have allayed any fears of Perdiccas about Amphipolis (436); but subsequent Athenian action in the Thermaic Gulf, centred on Methone (434), could only exacerbate growing mutual suspicion. There was only one recourse for him when that occurred, and that was to apply to Athens' actual or prospective enemies.

<sup>48</sup>Diod. 7.15.2; 14.37.6. Diodorus' date is an inference. In 14.37.6. he puts the death of Archelaus, Perdiccas' successor, in 399/8, but says that he had ruled for seven years. This is obviously wrong against his own statement that Archelaus was on the throne in 410/9 (13.49.1.) Eusebius, quoting Diodorus (7.15.2), assigns a seventeen year rule to Archelaus. This has led editors to emend "seven" to "seventeen" in 14.37.6.

World War II has shown us how extremely difficult it is for countries whose territories lie in the vicinity of combat areas to maintain a consistent policy toward great warring powers. Self-interest inevitably dictates caution, and caution frequently demands that the glad hand of diplomacy be extended in opposite directions at the same time. It is easy to criticize Perdiccas for becoming over-involved in the action of the Peloponnesian War, but one suspects that the Athenians made it impossible for him not to become thus involved. It is not perhaps excessive to speculate that, if there had been Macedonian comedy-writers, we might have read of "lies from Athens" as being among imports into Macedonia.<sup>49</sup>

TRINITY COLLEGE, TORONTO

<sup>49</sup>*Suda s.v.* Perdiccas may preserve something of a more favourable tradition in noting that Hippocrates of Cos was a friend and Melanippides spent his life at his court.